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### MIDDLE EAST\*

## Does the War Mean Armageddon?

BY MEDFORD EVANS

To mitigate the presumption of tackling this subject at all, let's circle around it a bit, and—awesome as the matter is—treat it, at least initially, with an informality which is less inappropriate than it may seem, since it grows less out of blind frivolity on the verge of cataclysm than from half-hysterical apprehension. Some of us in the gloom-and-doom business are suddenly shook up with the flash thought that things may be at least as bad as we have been predicting and that if so it is going to be cryogenic comfort—not to mention being highly imprudent—to say, *I told you so*.

The writing of articles on national and international affairs is, of course, not determined by when or even whether great events occur, but by the publication schedule of the magazines for which one writes. Some months or weeks it gives a man furiously to think what to write about, as the political weather stagnates behind a stationary front. The autumn of 1973 is scarcely such a season. As I write now in late October, the problem is not to find a subject, but to choose between subjects—not to invest the subject with importance, but to keep the immense and inescapable importance of any one of several possible subjects from stunning consciousness into oblivion.

Yet above all others two crises cry out for treatment, for some kind of response by the spectator or critic of the drama on the world stage. These are the Arab-Israeli crisis in the Middle East, and the Constitutional crisis in the White House. Which of these should have priority on the agenda of our concern as responsible citizens for the welfare and security of the nation? On which should we first focus our attention? The answer is that the two are inextricably inter-related. The domestic and the foreign crises are so fully reciprocal that it is impossible to analyze one without encountering the other. In a general way this is traditionally the case. Yet there is an element of novelty in the present national and international situation. Whereas students of statecraft have long been familiar with the gambit of a government's provoking a foreign war in order to conceal—and heal—division at home, it is certainly more extraordinary if not unprecedented for a government, or the forces behind government, to provoke division at home in order to conceal leading the country into a foreign war.

Presumably the reason why the traditional gambit is the more familiar is that governments have heretofore as a rule been impelled by the institutional instinct of self-preservation, and have relied on the corresponding instinct of the nations under their guidance to close ranks against a foreign adversary. The people want victory over the enemy, and know

they must unite to get it. But when a government is animated, as ours seems to be, by a determination to merge itself into a larger sovereignty†, foreign war may be sought not for victory and reclamation of the government's prestige with its own people, but for achievement of a situation in which surrender will seem plausible to the people, on the ground that no superseding international sovereignty or World Government could be worse than the national government which got them into such a mess.

The war in Vietnam—which from start to finish was promoted, conducted, mismanaged, condemned, and ingloriously phased out by the same "Liberal" and radical community—alienated millions of Americans, particularly the young, from the very concept of their country, and for millions more destroyed confidence in, and even respect for, incumbent personnel in the national government. Vietnam, considered as a project to promote World Government, succeeded in achieving a previously undreamed-of degree of national disillusion in the United States. Vietnam, of course, was not the first such project, having been preceded by Korea. If to Korea and Vietnam there should be added a proportionally increased failure of American military power, final liquidation of national sovereignty could reasonably be expected. The merger could take place.

On the historical record, the only way nations merge is through war. One side surrenders to the other. Since the United States is committed not to fight a war for victory, this nation must, if international merger is to be achieved, fight a war to defeat. This is what we practiced doing in Korea and Vietnam. Maybe the rehearsals are over and we are ready for the big play.

### Kissinger In Collaboration

And a scenario is worthless if no one produces the show. Your successful planner of future human society (which is how arch conspirators regard themselves) must find a producer, employ (or himself be) the director, employ actors—from stars to extras—prepare the sets, assemble the props, schedule and conduct rehearsals, and—finally—open the show. As indicated above, the curtain is now going up in

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† A determination curiously the opposite of the maligned but more familiar "imperialistic" determination to enlarge the scope of one's own sovereignty.

the Middle East (the scene is not yet fully disclosed) on what promises to be a global tragedy.

The play is anonymous, but like some of the Elizabethan tragedies it is undoubtedly a work of collaboration—in which, however, the hand most evident is that of Henry Kissinger. Stephen Graubard—surely the best authority on Kissinger—has said that the man's object has been (it presumably still is) "to secure a stable international order." Kissinger's own writings, which Professor Graubard has analyzed with almost complete thoroughness, make clear that the means to the end of the stable international order he envisions are diplomatic negotiation, of which he has already given us such brilliant if disastrous examples, and limited war, which has now begun in the Middle East.

Kissinger's preoccupation with foreign affairs, however, has not at all caused him to neglect the domestic scene. On the contrary, he has repeatedly, to quote Graubard again, "emphasized the importance of seeking and gaining domestic support for significant foreign policies." Hence the engineering of the Democratic nomination of George McGovern, in order to insure the Nixon landslide of 1972 (which was taken as evidence of America's popular support of—more than *détente*, of *rapprochement* with—both Peking and Moscow); hence the grand diversion of Watergate, which has allowed cinematic revelations of domestic disorder to absorb public attention while through trade and diplomacy unrelenting application to the business of securing "a stable international order" has continued.

As a measure of Kissinger's achievement in the world monopoly game, it may be recalled that his splitting the \$120,000 Nobel "Peace Prize" with North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho appeared as hardly more than a footnote in his general spate of publicity. Hearing between planes at the airport that you are to be a Nobel laureate, jotting down on an envelope in your pocket, "Have Haig remind me to go to Oslo December 10 and pick up that \$60,000"—that is the big time. Graubard indicates the kind of activity which would naturally enough make the Nobel Prize seem incidental. Observing that information relating to our policy reversal regarding Red China and Soviet Russia is still, and will long remain, classified (no one is demanding to hear *those* tapes), Graubard says that nevertheless certain things are evident:

*Clearly the strategy was based on an active diplomacy—much of it secret—and almost all of it involving Kissinger . . . There was no way of knowing for certain how the Soviet Union would react when it learned of the approaches the United States had made to Peking. Clearly, the administration believed that the reaction would not be so unfavourable as to jeopardize the various concrete plans for improved relations that Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador in Washington [Anatole Dobrynin] had been discussing for well over two years.*

Remember that Nixon announced his planned pilgrimage to Peking on July 15, 1971. If Kissinger had been discussing "concrete plans" with Dobrynin "for well over two years," then such discussions must have begun in 1969, or very soon after Nixon's first inauguration. But in that case Nixon must have known when he was campaigning in 1968 that his line on Communism was due to make a hairpin curve

as soon as he got in office. Graubard brings out, by the way, that it was during Rockefeller's 1968 campaign against Nixon that Kissinger, who was then *Nelson Rockefeller's* advisor on foreign policy, worked out the approach to "a stable and creative world order" which he would subsequently pursue under (?) Nixon. We should not underestimate a man who can obtain the top appointment from a winning Presidential candidate apparently on the basis of work he did for a losing candidate.

The Rockefeller foreign policy, which was Kissinger's, was not acceptable to the American people, but it was acceptable to Richard Nixon, who had been elected on the assumption that he had a contrary policy. Many Americans do not see even yet where the Rockefeller-Kissinger-Nixon foreign policy leads, but more do see it than formerly, and as the crisis sharpens in the Middle East, the ominous outlines of the projected "world order" may well become more clearly discernible.

### Henry's Limited Wars

Henry Kissinger, the global diplomat, does not think of diplomacy as consisting entirely of negotiations. Statecraft involves deeds as well as words, and if the words are more frequent the deeds are more decisive. The kind of deed regarding which Henry Kissinger is considered at present the world's foremost expert is "limited war." It was limited war which was the subject of his most important book, *Nuclear Weapons And Foreign Policy*. Some have considered Kissinger to be the author of our policy in Vietnam, but this may be unfair to his predecessor as National Security Advisor, Walt Whitman Rostow, of "an end to nationhood" fame. The two men have much in common, but as of now it would seem that Rostow was the precursor, while Kissinger is the authentic mystagogue, the pontifex maximus of the rite of limited war.

According to Graubard, Kissinger's doctrine of limited war was developed as a result of his dissatisfaction with prevailing ideas regarding total war in the Truman and early Eisenhower Administrations, when discussion centred so largely on the possibility of the Red Army's overrunning Western Europe, and the countervailing possibility of American retaliation with atomic weapons. "Massive retaliation" was the threat somewhat unconvincingly invoked by John Foster Dulles, Kissinger's predecessor as Secretary of State, against Communist aggression anywhere in the world. It didn't work. As readers of Alan Stang's *The Actor* will understand, it no doubt was not intended to work.

Even so, the very concept made Reds on both sides of the Iron Curtain very nervous. Kissinger proceeded to argue against it, on grounds calculated to appeal to anti-Communists. (Any argument against it would appeal to pro-Communists.) "Massive retaliation" did not work because it was not seriously intended. Kissinger was correct in criticizing it on this score. Incisively he wrote: "A deterrent which one is afraid to implement when it is challenged ceases to be a deterrent."

Kissinger did not suggest, however, that the United States should actually implement the deterrent in appropriate situations; he did not point out that use of atomic weapons in Korea would have prevented Red China's ever becoming a great power. (Considering the terrain, the "human sea" tactics of the Chinese Communists, and the known inability

of the Soviets, much less the Chinese, to reply with atomic weapons of their own, tactical use of nuclear weapons in Korea in late November or early December 1950 could have ended that war instantly, and with an unambiguous American victory.)

Rather, Henry Kissinger argued that the idle U.S. nuclear threat did nothing to "avert the Korean war, the loss of northern Indo-China, the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, or the Suez crisis." He took for granted that our threat to use nuclear weapons had to be idle, because he took for granted (what is now known to have been false at the time, whatever may have developed later) that Soviet Russia could respond in kind. Kissinger himself agreed in 1957 that as of 1950-1953 (the time of Korea) "our nuclear superiority was still very pronounced," but he did not allow for the continuance of that superiority far enough into the future to justify our ever threatening to use nuclear weapons strategically.

Graubard paraphrases Kissinger: "Even were such a threat to be made, it would not be believed; were it to be carried out . . . , the country would be guilty of bringing about its own suicide." In view of the national psychology developed by, among others, Kissinger himself and his associates in the Council on Foreign Relations, it came to be incontestable that no American threat to use nuclear weapons would be believed. The consequence of this development is stated by Graubard:

*The prospect was not for rash action but for inaction; it was this that Kissinger found most disturbing. He wanted to develop a strategy that would free the United States from having to choose between mutually unsatisfactory options—"between all-out war and a gradual loss of positions, between Armageddon and defeat without war." Kissinger, in searching for a new strategy, asked whether "limited war" did not provide a viable military option for the nuclear age.*

The sequel was Vietnam. Whether that demonstrated the viability of limited war as a military option is arguable, but prevalent sentiment has been increasingly against it since 1968. The national trauma resulting from Vietnam is the chief reason why direct U.S. involvement in the present limited war in the Middle East would not have the traditional effect of unifying the nation, but would divide it even more widely and deeply.

### **Middle East Crisis**

I had scarcely written the preceding paragraph when the Middle Eastern crisis deepened. As I now write, the nation is under a military alert, and Henry Kissinger has just told a news conference that emergency powers are *not* being invoked because of the domestic discord over Watergate and the tapes—a statement calculated to suggest to your average paranoid (i.e., someone who regularly follows the news) that to clamp down on domestic dissent is precisely the reason why emergency powers are being invoked. As an above-average paranoid myself, I don't buy the suggestion. My suspicion is that the hassle over Watergate, the Vice Presidency, and the Presidency, has been heated up and aired, first, to divert attention from the seriousness of our involvement in the war in the Middle East; second, to prepare the way for a sudden access of public contrition, with readiness to forget all and rally round our leaders (whoever they may be) at last; third, as indicated hereintofore, to cushion the shock, once war has been entered upon and badly bungled,

of some proposed solution by surrender—not to the Soviets exactly (though in the interim we oppose them just enough to give them the status of a belligerent adversary, while placating them enough to preserve their status as partners in *détente* and the search for peace), but to some new international agency, in which American-Russian partnership will replace American-Russian hostility, to the temporary relief of all Americans who do not realize that such a merger would be in fact an enormous victory for the Soviets.

I am writing this in October; you will be reading it (if at all) in December. The question people are asking today is: Will we, the United States, go to war in the Middle East as a result of the present confrontation there? The question may have been answered in the affirmative before this issue of *American Opinion* reaches you; it cannot have been answered in the negative, for the crisis will not be quickly resolved. The cause of the crisis is Arab opposition to the mere existence of the state of Israel. That opposition will not soften, nor will that state have ceased to exist by Christmas.

But the Arab-Israeli hostility is not an isolated phenomenon. Israel is seconded by the United States, the Arabs by the Soviet Union. The conflict is widely considered to be a war by proxy between the superpowers. What gives the scene its grotesque quality is the fact that even while the superpowers "resupply" the belligerents with the means of war they continue their diplomatic minuet of *détente* with each other. *That we incite our respective children to kill each other is no reason why we should not continue our own liaison.* Thus might Kissinger and Dobrynin reassure each other in private conversations. Yet this paradox cannot endure indefinitely. As the only farcical element in the Middle Eastern drama it may have been played out by the time you read these words.

### **Editing the Playbill**

What should not be overlooked is the fact that the American backing of Israel is of a different order from the Soviet backing of the Arabs. I used the word *children* above in my imagined *tete-a-tete* between Kissinger and Dobrynin. But the Arab states are not the children of the Soviet Union. Israel is an offspring of the United States. And, to italicize the paradox, the Soviet Union might be called Israel's godfather. Let me explain:

After long and bloody recrimination and strife Palestine in November 1947 was partitioned between the Arabs and the Jews, by vote of the United Nations General Assembly. As they would do nine years later in the Suez crisis of 1956, the United States and the Soviet Union stood together on the issue. But voting partition, and establishing partition, are not identical. The country was under a British mandate which was to expire May 15, 1948. The British refused to enforce partition, which was against the wishes of the large Arab majority then in the region. Guerrilla warfare raged between Zionists and Arabs, with the former generally prevailing. On May 14, 1948, the last British High Commissioner left Palestine. The same day the Jewish National Council and the General Zionist Council at Tel Aviv proclaimed the establishment of Israel. Within hours the United States recognized the new state.

It is said that the astonishing rapidity of the American recognition was due to the impulsiveness of Harry Truman. It may also be gathered from (for example) the *Forrestal*

*Diaries* that President Truman was influenced by Clark Clifford and David K. Niles. There is no argument about the fact that recognition and support of Israel by the United States emanated from the Truman White House—against resistance, as it happened, from within the State Department and the Department of Defense. Be that, however, as it may be, recognition of Israel by the Soviet Union followed U.S. recognition by only three days, on May 17, 1948. In any case, the Soviets were apparently not pro-Arab in November 1947 or May 1948.

By 1955 they seem to have become so, and provided Egypt with jet aircraft and other material which emboldened Nasser to seize the Suez Canal in July 1956. Three and a half months later Israel, Britain and France all moved against Nasser, whose Sinai bases were taken by the Israelis, and whose Soviet-supplied planes were destroyed on the ground by the French and British, but who was rescued by joint Soviet-American pressure, implemented by U.N. "peace-keeping" forces and the presence in the Mediterranean of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

The feeling of *déjà vu* which you get from today's Middle Eastern crisis is traceable to the Suez crisis of 1956, which was itself somewhat obscured by (and reciprocally obscured) the simultaneous crisis of the Hungarian uprising. Today is not the first time we have joined forces with the Soviets and through United Nations machinery imposed restraints upon the Israelis. Yes, upon the Arabs, too, but on balance to their relative advantage. In 1956 Nasser had no reason to complain of our final decision regarding the Suez affair, and in 1973 it has been Sadat who has requested Soviet-American intervention to stop the fighting in the Middle East while there is a residual Arab gain, relative to the situation prior to Yom Kippur.

None of all that alters the fact that Israel is a quasi-American colony—one which we have not always supported, and which perhaps we should never have established in the first place, yet still an American colony, virtually licensed by our President Truman, largely financed out of New York, and currently led by the American Jewess Golda Meir. And since Israel is so thoroughly identified with America, an Israel defeat, or reversal of advantage, at the hands of Soviet-supported Arabs is—from the point of view of world prestige—an American defeat or reversal at the hands of the Soviets. I speak not of things as they ought to be, but of things as they are.

### What It May Mean

Consider how such things might strike one whose great object is to secure a "stable international order." (One World.) Standing in the way of such a world order are various obstacles, but none more formidable than (1) the lingering belief that, despite Vietnam and vaunted Soviet achievements in space and nucleonics, America is still Number One by too wide a margin to permit merging with Russia as if the two were equals, and (2) the mere existence of an explicitly Jewish state (whether fully sovereign or a quasi-American colony scarcely matters from the Arab point of view) in a land which is at once the geopolitical center of the globe, and adjacent to strategically indispensable oil reserves to which local Arab leaders might well deny all access. A study of historical maps will remind one that though empires have succeeded one another in the Middle East throughout thousands of years of recorded time, none

but Arabs ever extended their sway over the major portion of the Arabian peninsula, except that the littorals of both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf were dominated for a time by the Ottoman Turks, themselves followers of Mohammed. Presumably a modern world state might exert enough force to destroy the Arabs root and branch, but it would be a most uneconomical way to go about securing the Middle Eastern oil. Far more convenient to appease the Arabs with the sacrifice of Israel. The Arabs have a complex about Israel. So humour them! As Owen Lattimore said of Korea, the thing to do is to let Israel fall, but not let it look as though we had pushed it.

Today's news is that there are 897 men from Austria, Finland and Sweden in the U.N.'s janissary force which is to police the ceasefire in Syria and Sinai. The number is slated, one hears, to go to 7,000. Big deal! This is play-acting. More serious is the presence of Russian and American "observers"—which is to say intelligence agents. There is a possibility that the war between proxies could turn into war between the principals. Only that possibility, and the other possibility of joint military action by the United States and the Soviets (which is what Sadat requested—and he would never have requested it if he had dreamed such a partnership could conceivably support Israel) now exercises any restraint on the combatants in the Yom Kippur war.

The idea of an armed clash between the Soviets and the Americans must not be without its attraction for anyone trying to arrange that "stable international order." It should not be a clash with nuclear weapons. The disparity in favor of the Americans is still too great; on the battlefield the SALT might quickly lose its savor. It should be a limited war. Heretofore there has been no place for Russia and America to fight a limited war. For geographical reasons neither Vietnam nor Cuba was suitable for direct conflict between the superpowers. Western Europe was not suitable, because the stakes are too high to keep war there limited, and if N.A.T.O. suddenly acquired real meaning (which, as we have seen, it does not have in the Middle East) the outcome would probably be not only the devastation of Christendom but also the end of Communism. Since Western civilization is the prize, and Communism is the ideology through which one hopes to win the prize, such an outcome would be doubly counterproductive.

The Middle East is a different scene. It is the only place in the world where a confrontation of ground forces between the Soviet Union and the United States is possible, because it is the only place (except Western Europe) which both superpowers can reach with ground forces, which is at the same time worth fighting over. Presumably a war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East would not involve use of nuclear weapons, for it would waste the weapons to drop them on the desert, and would greatly damage the prize to drop them on the oil fields. Middle Eastern cities could be bombed, but since they do not belong to either Russia or America, neither belligerent would suffer enough from such an attack to make it worth the cost.

On balance, it seems likely that the Middle East as theatre of war would be more convenient for the Russians than for the Americans. Thus the possibility of war there between the superpowers must not be dismissed out of hand. If an American commander should surrender to a Russian in Baghdad or Damascus, you could well have the cornerstone of a world

state. (If the Russian surrendered to the American we would keep the oil, but otherwise just walk away and leave things to work themselves out.) Yet the same result may be more calmly obtained by sacrificing Israel (not too abruptly, but diplomatically) to the Arabs. If Israel falls, the U.S. is defeated. The thorn is removed from the Arabs' side, the Soviet Union is confirmed as a superpower worthy of merging with its humbled (but still very rich) rival. Management of the Middle Eastern oil fields will be no problem in a stable international order, possibly policed from a secularized and supranationalized Jerusalem. Are loss of Israel and defeat of the United States too great a price to pay for One World? Henry Kissinger may think not.

If the Soviets defeat us in the Middle East, either directly or through their Arab proxies defeat Israel, we would be justified, would we not, in seeking a negotiated settlement? Superb diplomacy would extricate us from military failure, and the settlement could well become the basis of the Russian-American merger and that "stable international order."

No, the Yom Kippur war is not the Biblical Armageddon. (At least I don't think it is.) It is, rather, a simulacrum of final conflict, which may well be used as a pretext to leave Israel swinging in the wind. Will we go to war in the Middle East? Probably not. Sorry about that. For it means, objectively speaking, that we shall surrender first.

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## Israel's Ring in our Nose\*

BY DAN SMOOT

Should President Nixon be impeached? Yes, but not for Watergate. The leaders of one political party breaking the law to spy on opposition leaders, and then lying to avoid disclosure and public censure; prominent politicians hiding the source of their political funds and using some of the money for their own gain—such behaviour is reprehensible. It is not rendered acceptable by the fact that it has long been commonplace among politicians. But, relatively speaking, all the shenanigans associated with Watergate are peccadilloes in comparison with what Presidents and Members of Congress have been doing to our country for a generation.

Nothing in the Watergate scandals undermines our constitutional system or endangers the life of our Republic; but the major policies of Republican and Democrat parties have done both. Nothing yet disclosed in the Watergate affair involved using our tax money to finance the enemies of our country at home and abroad; but poverty-war programs and foreign-aid operations (supported by top leaders of both parties) have been using our tax money to finance Communist subversion and insurrection within the United States and Communist governments overseas. Thus, every Member of Congress who has suggested impeaching President Nixon *because of Watergate* has himself committed the impeachable offense of violating his sworn oath to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States. Meanwhile, they duck behind Watergate while Mr. Nixon goes to new excesses. Consider:

On October 6, 1973, Richard Nixon intervened in the Middle East war. He sent to Israel millions of dollars' worth of military equipment that had been authorized for our own defense establishment, thus dangerously depleting our war reserves—at a time when other Nixon policies are already reducing our military power in comparison with the Soviet Union. It is being estimated that Mr. Nixon's intervention, even if it does not get us involved in the fighting, will cost American taxpayers a minimum of \$5 billion—at a time when high taxation and soaring government expenditures are already increasing the cost of living and straining our economy toward the breaking point.

Without achieving *anything* beneficial for the United States, President Nixon's costly intervention in the Arab-Israeli war endangered our Middle Eastern source of oil at a time when other governmental policies are rapidly driving us into dependence on that source of supply.

Did the intervention gain friends and allies for the United States? No, it further alienated the once-friendly Arab nations, intensifying their hatred of America, driving them deeper into fatal dependence on the Soviet Union. Mr. Nixon's unlawful action of providing Israel with military supplies while battles were raging unmasked the hostility of nations which have received, from the American government, many billions of our tax dollars as aid intended, ostensibly, to bind them to us as reliable allies in time of need. Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Italy (which have received from our government well over sixteen billion of our tax dollars as

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aid) *publicly* prohibited the United States from using their air space or any part of their territories for supplying Israel. Great Britain (which, alone, has received almost eight billion of our tax dollars as aid) and other N.A.T.O. "allies" whom our government has liberally subsidized for thirty years, *privately* told the Nixon Administration to stay out of their air space and territories while supplying Israel.

The Nixon intervention in the Middle East even caused a worsening in our relationship with Israel. Policies of the American government have caused Israel to expect our aid as a matter of course, regardless of any harm that may come to the United States as a result of the aid. Consequently, the Israelis do not really ask for our aid. They demand it, and make little effort to conceal their irritation if it is not as instantaneous or abundant as they wish. The fact that our government responds to this Israeli attitude with an almost-groveling eagerness to please poses a perpetual threat to the security and welfare of the United States: It has the effect of giving Israeli officials the power of decision about the expenditure of American tax money—even about the commitment of the American nation to war. The undertone of threatening cajolery displayed by Prime Minister Golda Meir during her visit to Washington in late October and early November of 1973 revealed that President Nixon's intervention in the Middle East had fortified the Israelis in their dangerous attitude that the United States has an absolute obligation to support Israel, at any time at any cost.

Did Mr. Nixon's intervention in the Middle East promote world peace? No. President Nixon did not intervene as a peace maker, applying pressures equally to both sides. He intervened as a partisan, supporting one belligerent while war was in actual progress—thus making the United States (technically, at least) a co-belligerent.

What constitutional right did the President have for his action? None. Without a formal declaration of war by Congress, the President cannot legally commit us to war, unless our nation is being invaded or is otherwise under actual attack. Congress was not even asked for its informal advice and consent to Nixon's intervention in the Arab-Israeli war. In fact, Congress was not consulted at all.

Yet, not one Member of Congress hot to impeach Richard Nixon for Watergate has criticized him for his unlawful intervention in the Middle East. The Members of Congress who were cooing doves about Vietnam are as hawkish as is Nixon himself about getting us involved with Israel in the Middle East.

### Actions Justifying Impeachment

Obviously, Congress will never consider impeaching Richard Nixon for his genuinely impeachable offenses against the best interests of the United States, because Congress is a party to those offenses. The need to distract the people from noticing, or comprehending the gravity of, those offenses is probably one reason for the endless stirring of the Watergate mess.

But the people had better begin to notice and comprehend, before it is too late.

After exercising illegal Executive power to send Israel millions of dollars' worth of military goods, President Nixon sent Congress (on October 18, 1973) a bill which would legislatively "authorize" the President to give Israel another

\$2.2 billion in aid—the money to be appropriated *to the President*, for him to spend for, or pass on to, Israel as and when he pleases. Here are pertinent provisions of the Aid-To-Israel Bill which Richard Nixon is asking Congress to pass:

"Section 2. In addition to such amounts as may be otherwise authorized to be appropriated to the President for security assistance . . . there are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President not to exceed \$2,200,000,000 for emergency military assistance or foreign military sales credits, or for both as the President may determine, for Israel . . . .

"Section 3. Foreign military sales credits extended to Israel out of such funds shall be provided on such terms and conditions as the President may determine . . . .

"Section 4. At any time prior to June 30, 1974, the President is hereby authorized . . . to release Israel from its contractual liability to pay for defense articles and defense services purchase or financed under the said Foreign Military Sales Act or under this Act during the period beginning October 6, 1973, and ending June 30, 1974 . . . ."

Congressman H.R. Gross (R.-Iowa) says the Section 4 provision in the Aid-To-Israel Bill "simply means that President Nixon could make credit sales to Israel up to \$2.2 billion and then release that country from liability to repay a single dollar." Mr. Gross calls this an "absolutely unbelievable provision requested by a President who pretends to believe in representative government and its separation of powers." He adds:

"If the Members of Congress are such dupes that they will now rubber-stamp this legislation as demanded by Nixon they will have: (1) made their biggest single contribution yet to the establishment of dictatorship in this country, and (2) they will have further inflamed our former friends and now enemies in the Arab world who are vital to our entire national welfare.

"How much longer will the people of America watch, without serious protest, the further insidious destruction of their once representative government?"

To put the matter even more bluntly: If we do not get the Israeli ring out of our nose, the time will come when American blood as well as American wealth will be squandered in the Middle East. A ring in the nose is what it has been since 1948.

### The History Of The Ring

Our internationalist foreign policy—built on foreign aid "to help ourselves by helping others"—has led us into many dangerous straits. Korea and Vietnam were two of them. Another, and potentially the most dangerous of all, is in Palestine.

Palestine is a region, at the southeastern end of the Mediterranean, about the size of New Hampshire. It is the Canaan or Promised Land to which Moses led the children of Israel from Egypt. For a brief period at the beginning of the Tenth Century, B.C., all of Palestine was a Jewish nation. Following the reign of King David, war between the tribes of Israel severed the Jewish nation in Palestine into two Hebrew kingdoms known as Israel and Judah. Assyrians conquered Israel in 722 B.C.; Babylonians conquered Judah in 587 B.C. The last remnant of a Jewish state was gone

from the land of Palestine, and so were most of the Jews. In the Second Century, B.C., the Maccabees established a new Jewish nation in Palestine; but it lasted only 79 years. For the next 2,000 years, Palestine was a province or protectorate of various empires. Its inhabitants for most of that time were largely Arabs.

Palestine is, in fact, the heart of the Arab homeland. Throughout the Middle Ages (and afterward), when there was harsh hostility between Christians and Jews in the Christian nations of Europe, Jews and Arabs got along well together. The relatively few Jews who sought refuge in Palestine and other Arab lands were welcome.

Conflict between Arabs and Jews began in the late Nineteenth Century when the movement known as Zionism was formally launched. The Zionist claim was that Palestine is historically Jewish land. Its purpose was to colonize Palestine with enough alien Jews from Europe, Asia, and America to take the land away from Arabs and create a Jewish political state.

What if a small group of people from Asia, Europe, and Africa, laid claim to the entire Western Hemisphere, basing their claim on their own assertion that they are the descendants of Indians who possessed the Hemisphere long ago but vanished 2,000 years before the white man ever arrived? Their claim would be on par with the Zionist claim that Palestine belongs to alien Jews who wish to go there.

Simultaneously with the emergence of Zionism, a strong sense of nationalism was developing among Arabs in Palestine. For many centuries they had lived there, but always under the rule of a foreign power. They wanted national independence.

Then World War I began (1914), Palestine was a province of the Turkish empire. The Turks were allies of Germany. Arab guerrilla forces helped the British fight the Turks because the British promised to support Arab national independence in Palestine (and in other Arab lands). But the British also promised to support establishment of a "National Home for the Jewish People" in Palestine. This British deal with Zionists was made not because of any military assistance Jews could give in Palestine, but because of the enormous wealth, power, and influence of interested Jews, especially in the United States.

Thus Zionism and Arab nationalism were put on a collision course in Palestine.

In the interval between World War I and World War II, Palestine was a British protectorate. Hostility between Arabs and Jews had developed; but, prior to the mid-1930s, it did not amount to much because there were not many Jews there.

Nazism in Germany, however, stimulated large-scale Jewish migration to Palestine. By 1935, European Jews were moving into Palestine at a rate of more than 60,000 a year. Hostility between Arabs and Jews deepened into violent hatred. Both formed guerilla bands. When Arab guerrillas committed atrocities or acts of terrorism against Jews, Jewish guerrillas retaliated in kind.

Conflict subsided in the latter part of 1939 when German military power in North Africa became a threat to the entire Middle East. But defeat of the German army at El Alamein on November 3, 1942, put an end to the German threat. Almost immediately a secret Jewish army was formed in Palestine and armed with weapons stolen from the British.

Bands of Jewish guerrillas spread death and terror throughout the Arab population. Arabs retaliated.

Before World War II ended, Zionists were putting heavy pressure on American politicians to support Zionist aims in Palestine; but President Franklin D. Roosevelt said that a Jewish state in Palestine could be established and maintained only by military force. On April 5, 1945, President Roosevelt wrote a letter to the King of Saudi Arabia, confirming an earlier personal promise that the United States would not support the Zionist aim of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. Roosevelt's State Department and his Joint Chiefs of Staff had urged this stand because: (1) the oil and strategic location of the Middle East made the area vital to U.S. interests; (2) Arab people, numbering more than 100 million, and their governments, were traditionally friendly toward the U.S.; (3) United States support for a Jewish state in Palestine would alienate Arabs and drive them into the Soviet orbit.

President Truman reiterated the Roosevelt promise to Arabs, but Truman (like all Presidents since) could not resist Zionist pressures. On May 14, 1948, Zionists proclaimed that the State of Israel existed. Eleven minutes after this proclamation was made in Palestine, the White House in Washington announced formal U.S. recognition of the new nation.

### Intervention Breeds Intervention

In his memoirs, President Truman reveals his resentment of Zionists for the intense pressures they put on him to support their machinations in Palestine; but he claims he acted not in response to their demands, but out of compassion for Jewish refugees in Europe who did not want to return to their nations of origin. To help these Jewish refugees, Mr. Truman sacrificed a roughly equivalent number of Palestinian Arabs. The Arabs were driven from their homeland, into conditions far worse and more hopeless than the succored Jews endured in Europe. Truman says that, in addition to feeling compassion for homeless Jews in Europe, he also felt a responsibility to implement the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the Balfour Declaration being the old World War I promise of the British to support the establishment of a "National Home for the Jewish People" in Palestine. Truman does not explain why an American President in 1948 had any responsibility for implementing a promise which the British government made in 1917—a promise which the British themselves had been repudiating since 1922, when Winston Churchill asserted that the Balfour Declaration never contemplated the creation of a "wholly Jewish Palestine."

The truth is that Harry Truman, underdog in the 1948 Presidential election, desperately needed Jewish support, especially in New York where, in one city, at least two million Jews resided. In breaking his own and President Roosevelt's promise to Arabs, Truman turned more than 100 million Arabs from friends to enemies of the United States, and drove them into the waiting arms of the Soviet Union; and he created in the Middle East a situation which daily threatens a world-shattering explosion.

Ever since May 14, 1948, our government has again and again supported Israel no matter what she has done, and much that she has done has been grossly damaging to American interests. At the same time, however, we have

given Arab nations billions of dollars in aid, trying vainly to buy back their friendship. *Thus, we have been financing both sides in the Middle Eastern conflicts.*

It was tragically wrong for us to get involved in the Middle East. We should get out immediately, and follow a policy of benign neutrality, giving no aid to Arabs or Israelis. A good way to start is for the people to alert their representatives in Congress with demands that Congress defeat the Aid-To-Israel legislation proposed by President Nixon in October.

## ROTHSCHILD AND ROME

The socialist peer, Lord Rothschild, has warned the country of difficulties ahead which, presumably, he considers may only be tackled by his collectivist philosophy. Reports of his speech hint at no criticism of financial methods which have caused these difficulties and threats of restriction.

A Christian might remind himself that "the object of Anti-Christ is to keep mankind in ever larger mobs, thus defeating the object of Christ, to permit the emergence of self-governing, self-conscious individuals, exercising free will, and choosing good *because* it is good." And he will naturally repudiate a collectivist policy because it stems from an anti-Christian outlook or philosophy.

But the present day Christian will then find himself amazed at the reactions expressed in Roman Catholic papers to the overthrow of Allende, an avowed Marxist. He will in fact read (*Catholic Herald*, Sept. 21, 1973) that "the whole world should be mourning". The world should doubtless deplore bloodshed but should not be so naive as to disregard the implications of a Marxist Chile or to exculpate certain Roman Catholics from responsibility for the chaos. For we read that in the 1970 elections "a significant group in the Christian Left, including clergy, worked for Allende's election. Chief among these was Fr. Gonzales Arroyo S.J., who helped to found the continental organisation 'Christians for Socialism' which is committed to a Marxist solution to the problems of Latin America." Which, of course, is to cure arsenical poisoning with strychnine.

*The Tablet* (Sept. 22, 1973) admits that "of late the country has become a football field for foreign agencies. Fourteen Russian cultural institutes, an overactive East German mission and the hugely overstuffed Cuban ministry are cases in point." Yet the same article refers to the "hopeful initiative" of the Christian Democrat party and contrasts the Socialist Party in Chile with the "relatively more moderate Communist Party." And the issue publishes tributes to President Allende from Cardinal Enrique of Santiago and the Mexican bishop Mendez.

The welcome given to Marxism in some Roman Catholic circles shows a bankruptcy of ideas for which there is little excuse. Bishop Mendez said that Chile under Allende was "bringing hope to the Latin American people that they would achieve their aspirations for liberty and true democracy." (*The Tablet*.) He should have asked the peoples of Eastern Europe whether they were attaining liberty or democracy and, as a bishop, should have considered the extreme case of Albania, where the profession of religion can amount to

a capital offence. The pursuit of liberty and of collectivism cannot be reconciled by any system of logic, while atheism and Catholicism make strange bedfellows.

Some of the world's richest men heavily financed communism, for it attacks private property which is as essential to genuine freedom as life or liberty. Financial hegemony and Marxism are two weapons of attack against Christian freedom; we were told that many roads lead to destruction and these are two of them. To commend Marxism as a way to freedom is to mislead hopelessly.—H.S.

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